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1. Among the more striking spinoffs of postmodernism in the past 
fifteen years or so has been an arresting theory of history. On the 
assumption that "the historical text is an object in itself, made entirely 
from language, and thus subject to the interrogations devised by the 
sciences of language use from ancient rhetoric to modern semiotics" 1, 
postmodernists have set out to enlighten historians about their 
discipline. From that perspective, they have emphasized the intrinsic 
fictionality of historical writing, derided the factualist empiricism that 
purportedly governs the work of professional historians, dismissed 
the ideal of objectivity as a myth, and rejected the truth claims of 
traditional historiography. Historians have been invited to accept the 
postmodern approach as a means to critical self reflection and to the 
improvement of practice. 
Some postmodern theorists have taken a more overtly anti-histori-
cal line that bears directly on important questions of theory and prac-
tice. Rejecting the putative "autonomy" claims of professional histo-
riography, they dismiss the notion of a distinctively "historical" mode 
of understanding the past. On this view, the study of origins and de-
velopment is of limited analytical value; and the historicist principle 
of historical specificity or individuality is the remnant of a venerable 
tradition that has been displaced. It follows that historians ought to 
give up their claim to special authority in the study of the past. This 
article will concentrate on the postmodern rejection of the notion that 
the past has to be understood "historically." 
1 Hans KELLNER, "Introduction: Describing Re-Descriptions" in Frank 
ANKERSMIT and Hans KELLNER (eds.), A New Philosophy of History, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 9. 
[Memoria y Civilización 2, 1999, 203-222] 
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On the whole, historians have been cool to the postmodern project, 
albeit without adopting the narrowly polemical posture assumed by 
Geoffrey Elton and Gertrude Himmelfarb 2. More recently, Richard 
Evans has written the sort of even-handed but critical survey of the 
voluminous literature that probably represents the views of most 
historians 3. At this juncture then, as Dominick LaCapra has 
suggested, we may be in a position "where a more informed dialogue 
or debate between approaches... to history is possible," avoiding 
"either automatic defenses or dismissals of recent theoretical 
tendencies" 4. This article is intended to contribute to that sort of 
dialogue by setting forth as precisely as possible what appear to be 
the flaws in the postmodern dicta that historians have been asked to 
accept as accurate descriptions of their discipline. It deals with 
particular judgments advanced by postmodernists and touches only 
marginally on the elaborate theoretical structures that are said to 
sustain their conclusions. 
We can take as a point of departure LaCapra's apt comment that 
"history requires both as solid an empirical basis as the evidence 
allows and theoretically informed conceptualization that provides 
interpretive insight into facts and deepens the questions the historian 
poses to the past" 5. This is especially true at the moment, after 
decades of historiographical and methodological proliferation. The 
question at issue, however, is the value of postmodern theory for his-
torians. 
In considering that question we run into a practical problem that 
should be noted at the outset. There is no single, authoritative version 
of the theory. Rather, we find recurring themes, assumptions, 
2 See, for example, G. R. ELTON, Return to Essentials: Some Reflections 
on the Present State of Historical Study, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1991; Gertrude HIMMELFARB, On Looking into the Abyss, New 
York, Knopf, 1994. 
3 Richard J. EVANS, In Defence of History, London, Granta Books, 
1997. See also Joyce APPLEBY, Lynn HUNT, and Margaret JACOB (eds.), 
Telling the Truth About History, New York, Norton, 1994. 
4 Dominick LACAPRA, review of Keith WINDSCHUTTLE, The Killing 
of History, American Historical Review, 103, 1998, p. 149. 
5 Ibidem. 
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attitudes and dicta, expressed in multiple variants. Hence 
"postmodern theory of history" is an ideal type construct that 
embraces even more variation than usual. In this article I draw most 
of the illustrative material from the work of three disparate historians 
who have expounded postmodern themes with notable rhetorical and 
intellectual force: Dominick LaCapra, Robert Berkhofer and Allan 
Megill 6. Other recent formulations, some of them intended for 
undergraduates, are less nuanced 7. The fullest exposition of the 
conceptual foundations of postmodern theorizing about history is to 
be found in the writings of Hayden White and Frank Ankersmit 8, 
6 Dominick LACAPRA, "Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading 
Text" in D. LACAPRA and Steven L. KAPLAN, (eds.), Modern European 
Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New Perspectives, Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1982; Idem, History and Criticism, Ithaca, Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1987; Idem, "History, Language and Reading: Waiting for 
Crillon" in American Historical Review, 100, 1995, pp. 799-828. Robert 
BERKHOFER, Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1995. Allan MEGILL, '"Grand Narra-
tive' and the Discipline of History" in F. ANKERSMIT and H. KELLNER 
(eds.), op. cit., pp. 151-73. 
7 See, for example, Alun MUNSLOW, Deconstructing History, London, 
Routledge, 1997; Keith JENKINS, Re-Thinking History, London, Routledge, 
1991; On 'What Is History?': From Carr and Elton to Rorty and White, 
London, Routledge, 1995; Idem (ed.), The Postmodern History Reader, Lon-
don, Routledge, 1997. These works draw extensively on Hayden White. See 
also Patrick JOYCE, "The Return of History: Postmodernism and the Politics 
of Academic History in Britain" in Past and Present, 158, 1998, pp. 207-
235. Joyce emphasizes the value of the application of postmodern theory to 
historical practice. 
8 Although questions have been raised about whether White should be 
characterized as a postmodernist (notably by Wulf KANSTEINER, "Hayden 
White's Critique of the Writing of History" in History and Theory, 32, 1993, 
p. 274), it is clear that he has exercised an enormous influence on the move-
ment. He has been aptly described as "the progenitor of 'the new philosophy 
of history'" by Frank ANKERSMIT, "Bibliographical Essay" in F. 
ANKERSMIT and H. KELLNER (eds.), op. cit., p. 280. The books that have 
earned White that title are familiar: Metahistory: The Historical Imagination 
in Nineteenth-Century Europe, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1973; Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism, Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1978; The Content of the Form: Narrative Dis-
course and Historical Representation, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University 
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whose work has recently been subjected to a rigorous philosophical 
critique 9. 
If we take a bird's-eye view of postmodern theorizing about his-
tory, we find a number of interconnected flaws that severely limit its 
analytic value. First and foremost, its negative orientation —the 
preoccupation with exposing the "mythology of the discipline," 
defined in terms of an archaic scientistic empiricism— narrows the 
scope of the analysis. Having demolished the truth claims of history 
to their satisfaction, postmodern theorists stop right there, leaving a 
host of critical questions untouched. Thus, the rich resources of the 
"linguistic turn" have been brought to bear only within narrow limits 
imposed by extraneous assumptions. Second, the demythologizing 
impulse also contributes to the casual dismissal of the problem of 
understanding the past "historically" and obviates the need for argu-
ment in support of the anti-autonomy thesis. That is, attempts to 
describe a distinctive historical mode of understanding can be dis-
posed of as self-serving disciplinary ideology. Third, although there is 
no logical connection between the fictionality thesis and the anti-
autonomy thesis, the former performs a significant rhetorical 
function. Having constructed a "research paradigm" that caricatures 
the theory and practice of professional historiography, postmodern 
theorists can plausibly suggest that such a methodology is of no 
special value in the study of the past. Thus, postmodernism provides a 
redescription of history that not only removes its cognitive character 
Press, 1987. For Ankersmit's contribution to postmodern theory of history, 
see his History and Tropology: The Rise and Fall of Metaphor, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1994; Idem, "Statements, Texts and Pictures" 
in F. ANKERSMIT and H. KELLNER, op. cit., pp. 212-40. 
9 Chris LORENZ, "Can Histories Be True? Narrativism, Positivism, and 
the 'Metaphorical Turn,'" in History and Theory, 37, 1998, pp. 309-329, is a 
brilliant analysis of the "deep presuppositions" underlying the theories of 
Hayden White and Frank Ankersmit. John H. ZAMMITO, "Ankersmit's Post-
modernist Historiography: The Hyperbole of 'Opacity'" Ibidem, pp. 330-46 
carefully develops the theme stated in the subtitle; Perez ZAGORIN, 
"History, the Referent, and Narrative: Reflections on Postmodernism Now", 
in Ibidem., 38, 1999, pp. 1-24, is a critical discussion of a wide range of 
postmodern theorizing about history, with particular reference to its anti-
realism and narrativism. 
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but also its specifically historical traits. Finally, the narrow focus of 
postmodern theorizing means that it falls far short of what we have 
come to expect of theory and philosophy of history. As Chris Lorenz 
has said, "historical narratives constitute truth-claims that must be 
elucidated and not annihilated by philosophy of history 1 0. 
Postmodernism has swept the critical questions off the table. 
Postmodern theory is unable to deal adequately with questions 
concerning the methodological implications of the historicity of hu-
man life, because it embodies a constricting formalism. The assump-
tion that the fundamental characteristics of historical writing are de-
termined by the literary forms intrinsic to it blocks out empirical 
examination of historiographical practice and the paradigms that 
actually guide it. In particular, postmodernists assume that since his-
torians make extensive use of narrative, their work is governed by 
imperatives inherent in that genre. Hence history may be redescribed 
by showing the presence of characteristics dictated by the narrative 
form. When narrative is identified with fiction, this sort of formalist 
redescription supports the familiar postmodern emphasis on the fic-
tionality of history. Lorenz has noted the claim, made by Hayden 
White and Frank Ankersmit, among others, that "historical narratives 
have a metaphorical structure and therefore no truth-value" 1 1. In addi-
tion, the description of historical writing primarily in terms of such 
generic literary forms necessarily excludes the distinctively 
"historical" element in historians' approach to the past. That is, narra-
tive as such is not specifically adapted to the study of the past. What 
matters is the use to which historians put narrative, within complex 
paradigms whose development began with the Enlightenment, as his-
torians devised ways of dealing with phenomena of the historical 
world. But the conceptual structure of postmodern theory of history 
inhibits a recognition of these historiographical characteristics. There 
is point to Peter Ghosh's vehement rejection of the notion that "the 
kernel of historical writing must be found in its exemplification of 
1 0 Chris LORENZ, op. cit., p. 326. 
" Ibidem, p. 309. 
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deep, ahistorical literary forms —which is a kind of annihilation for 
the historian" 1 2. 
Postmodernists suggest that their view of history flows directly 
and necessarily from the "linguistic turn" in the human studies. They 
chide historians for their anti-theoretical stance in refusing to recog-
nize that literary theory has "impugned the very basis of traditional 
historical practice" 1 3. In actuality, however, postmodern theory repre-
sents only one version —nihilistic, anti-historical, and neo-
Nietzchean— of the linguistic turn. In work done in traditional phi-
losophy of history —by Paul Ricoeur, Louis Mink, and Jörn Rüsen, 
for example— the new linguistic-rhetorical theory has been applied 
more constructively to elucidate problems in the field1 4. 
In what follows I turn first (section 2) to the fictionality theme and 
the attack on the truth claims of professional historiography, which 
are said to rest on the sort of factualist empiricism that flourished 
early in this century. That theme is linked rhetorically to the rejection 
of the supposed "autonomy" claims made by professional historians 
(discussed in section 3), in the sense that the "research paradigm" 
attributed to them cannot sustain a claim to special authority in the 
study of the past. 
2. Historians of a postmodern persuasion assume that their conclu-
sions rest on the solid foundation of an omnicompetent literary-lin-
guistic-rhetorical theory. From that vantage point they confidently 
expose the "mythology" of professional historiography, impugn the 
"research paradigm" that supposedly governs its work, and 
demonstrate the intrinsic fictionality of historical writing. Hans Kell-
ner, a literary theorist, illustrates how postmodernism disposes of the 
truth claims of history. In his introduction to A New Philosophy of 
History, he "redescribes" history in such a way as to empty it of any 
1 2 Peter GHOSH, "Laid Down by Ranke" in London Review of Books, 20, 
October 15, 1998. 
1 3 Robert BERKHOFER, op. cit., p. 2. 
1 4 Louis MINK, Historical Understanding, Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 1987; Paul RICOEUR, Time and Narrative, I, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1984; Jörn RÜSEN, Rekonstruktion der Vergangenheit, 
Gottingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1986. 
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cognitive content. Kellner contends "that history can be redescribed 
as a discourse that is fundamentally rhetorical and that representing 
the past takes place through the creation of powerful, persuasive 
images which can be best understood as created objects, models, 
metaphors or proposals about reality." In this vein, he reminds his 
readers that "philosophers have shown less interest in the truth-value 
of the historical statement and have turned to the narrative as a whole, 
which will have a truth more akin to the truth of a novel or a painting 
than to that of a syllogism" 1 5. While postmodern historians may not 
subscribe to every detail of Kellner's theory of representation, they 
accept the formalist assumption that since history takes the form of 
narrative, its output must be characterized as fictional or 
metaphorical. Within that theoretical framework, these historians 
have set out to demonstrate the inadequacy of the positivist empiri-
cism and the "research paradigm" that they ascribe to professional 
historiography. 
Robert Berkhofer's full scale exposition of "history as text and 
discourse" is especially valuable because it is so explicit and detailed. 
His book develops a major postmodern theme that he had stated 
unequivocally some years before: "Contemporary literary theory 
defies the very intellectual foundations of current professional 
historical practice by denying the factuality that grounds the authority 
of history itself' 1 6. In his book Berkhofer elaborates on this thesis, 
contrasting the views of "literary and rhetorical theorists" with the 
naive conception of truth espoused by historians who believe that 
"the bare facts... constitute the truth of a history..." He derides what 
he characterizes as "the explicit factual message historians claim as 
the core of historical understanding." Over against this caricature of 
current historiographical theory and practice, Berkhofer suggests that 
in some instances "aesthetic, stylistic, or other criteria might consti-
tute the proper bases for determining the truthfulness of a history." 
Thus, allegorical and analogical truths, for example, "must be judged 
by the moral, political or other criteria appropriate to the higher her-
1 5 Hans KELLNER, op. cit., pp. 1-2. 
1 6 Robert BERKHOFER, "The Challenge of Poetics to (Normal) Histori-
cal Practice" in Poetics Today, 9, 1988, reprinted in Keith JENKINS (ed.), 
The Postmodern History Reader, p. 139. 
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meneutics that establish the greater or ultimate meanings of histories 
and history for readers" 1 7. On this view, professional historians, resis-
tant to the "higher hermeneutics," are bogged down in a fruitless 
examination of the documents. 
Like other historians of a postmodern persuasion, Berkhofer con-
tends that the factualist empiricism which he deplores constitutes the 
foundation of the research paradigm that dominates professional his-
toriography. At its core is "professionally accepted methods for ob-
taining facts about the past from surviving evidence or sources." It 
rests on the postulate of transparency, which holds that the documents 
provide the historian with a direct view of past reality. Historians are 
constrained by the simplistic epistemology that underlies their 
methodology: "The presupposition grounding normal historical prac-
tice is, therefore, that historians' works are accurate representations 
of an actual past, ideally as photographs are popularly thought to be 
of their subjects or at least as maps are of their terrain, in a more fre-
quently use analogy." In order to drive home his point that the es-
tablished historiographical paradigm has outlived its usefulness and is 
in the process of being superseded, presumably with the help of post-
modern theory, Berkhofer refers to "the paradigm of normal history." 
The analogy to Thomas Kuhn's concept of "normal science" suggests 
that professional historians are wedded to the sort of routinized 
methodology that invites a paradigm shift. On this view, the paradigm 
of "normal history," concerned primarily with extracting facts from 
sources, does not deal with "how those facts are combined into a 
larger expository synthesis" 1 8. So described, professional historiogra-
phy cannot claim special authority in the study of the past. 
Writing from a deconstructionist perspective, Dominick LaCapra 
has developed a number of postmodern themes in a series of essays 
dating from as early as 1982. At the very outset he mounted a critique 
of "documentary history," based on a simplistic factualist empiricism. 
He did not mince words: "Indeed a belief that historiography is a 
purely documentary or descriptive reconstitution of the past may be 
prone to blind fictionalizing because it does not explicitly and 
1 7 Robert BERKHOFER, op. cit. pp. 71-73. 
18 Ibidem, pp. 28-29, 34-38, 64. 
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critically raise the problem of the role of fictions (for example, in the 
form of models, analytic types, and heuristic fictions) in the attempt 
to represent reality." Such "documentary historiography... tries to 
exclude interpretation or to see it only in the guise of bias or 
subjectivity." Just which historians subscribe to this odd view of 
"interpretation" we are not told. 
A few years ago LaCapra again deplored the defects of 
"documentary history" and reminded historians that language is not 
"a purely transparent medium that may simply be looked through (or 
bracketed) in the interest of (re)presenting the object or findings of 
research." Language so described "poses problems for the historian 
(or other analyst) and signals the manner in which the observer is 
constitutively implicated in the object of research." At this point La-
Capra adds a Freudian twist to the postmodern line: "Freud framed 
this problem in terms of transference, and transference involves... the 
tendency of the analyst-analysand relation to repeat typically inappro-
priate parent-child relations..." LaCapra commends to the historian 
Freud's mode of handling these problems by attempting "to recall 
them in memory and critically work through them." Toward the end 
of his essay, he characterizes such working-through as "the goal of a 
controlled dialogic exchange with the past" 1 9. Whatever the utility of 
such a Freudian approach, it reinforces the postmodern tendency to 
concentrate on matters of fictionality and subjectivity to the neglect 
of concrete problems of historical conceptualization. 
In an elegant essay Allan Megill presents a number of postmodern 
themes without an elaborate theoretical apparatus, which is simply 
presupposed. Since the contours of "a new philosophy of history" 
have been well established, he sets forth a few salient principles in an 
ingenious framework and asks historians to recognize their validity. 
In the postmodern mode, Megill urges historians to "confront, in an 
explicit way, the fictionality implicit in all works of history." But he 
seeks a more subtle and flexible treatment of the "history/fiction 
dualism." That dualism has been of limited analytical value —subject 
Dominick LACAPRA, "Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading 
Texts" in D. LACAPRA and S. L. KAPLAN (eds.), op. cit., p. 79; "History, 
Language and Reading...", pp. 803-804, 828. 
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to polemical misuse by contending forces— and needs to be 
"complexified." To that end, he distinguishes between two kinds of 
fictionality: the "literary" and the "fictive." The former denotes works 
of fiction. The latter is intended as a softer and presumably more 
acceptable notion: "By the 'fictive' I mean all those dimensions 
wherein works of history diverge from truth in its sense as correspon-
dence to empirical reality." This formulation locates Megill firmly in 
the postmodern camp, despite his disclaimer that he is simply dis-
cussing an issue that cannot be resolved. In this sentence, for exam-
ple, he in effect dismisses Max Weber's handling of the difficult 
problem of constructing concepts capable of yielding a good descrip-
tion of historical phenomena 2 0. Since history cannot escape such 
"fictive fictionality," its truth claims are necessarily rather limited. 
The primary component of postmodern theory of history, then, is a 
misdescription of professional historiography, which is characterized 
as committed to a crude factualist empiricism that is embodied in a 
research paradigm whose scope is limited to extracting "facts" from 
documents. That direct assault on the truth claims of history, in turn, 
is reinforced by a formalist approach that assumes that historical 
writing is governed by the literary forms, notably narrative, that it 
necessarily employs. That assumption, central to the assertion of the 
intrinsic fictionality of history, requires the imposition of generic, 
trans-historical concepts in the description of historiographical theory 
and practice. Such concepts, however, have no place for the specifi-
cally "historical" aspects of historiographical paradigms. 
Such ahistorical formalism is spelled out at some length by Berk-
hofer. On this view, historians construct the real world "through the 
forms they use to give their texts the appearance of history." It 
follows that "to the extent that history is a story, ultimately it obeys 
the conventions of story-telling." Historians' understanding of inter-
pretation is inadequate because it "neglects the conventions 
governing its own construction." From this perspective, the task of 
the theorist is not to inquire into historical practice and its operative 
assumptions, but rather to uncover the dominant literary forms and 
2 0 Allan MEGILL, '"Grand Narrative'..." pp. 171-72. Emphasis in the 
original. 
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the "representations" that they require. Hence Berkhofer aims to 
describe "what historians must presuppose about the past in order to 
conceive it as history." Narrativization is the primary instrument of 
history so conceived: "normal historical practice uses narrative 
structuring... to transform the past into history." It follows that the 
salient features of historical practice are dictated by "narrative logic 
in some form" 2 1. 
As re-described by postmodernism, the "research paradigm" of 
professional historiography is a very crude instrument indeed. It 
clearly is of no special value for the study of the past. 
3. Along with the denial of the truth claims of professional histo-
riography, postmodernism also rejects the notion that there is a dis-
tinctively historical mode of understanding or that the past needs to 
be understood "historically." Whereas the fictionality thesis has been 
asserted with considerable theoretical elaboration, however, the anti-
autonomy dictum has been issued more casually, as if its validity had 
long been self evident. Some such assumption has been present in the 
postmodern canon from the beginning. On the first page of Meta-
history Hayden White anticipated, in manner and in substance, what 
was soon to become orthodox doctrine: "Continental European 
thinkers have cast doubt on the value of specifically historical 
'consciousness'" 2 2. More recently, Allan Megill has launched an 
aggressive attack on the belief in an "autonomously historical" mode 
of understanding. He expressed his doubts about the claim made by 
"'professional' or 'disciplinary' historiography... to a peculiarly 
authoritative role in the understanding of the past.. ." 2 5 
Defining the problem in terms of "autonomy," however, skews the 
debate at the very outset. In brief, since history is intrinsically inter-
disciplinary, it cannot be "autonomous" in any strict sense of the term 
and professional historians do not make such an extreme claim. 
Historiography as such does not possess self-sufficient analytical 
instruments of its own. From Thucydides to Ranke and beyond 
2 1 Robert BERKHOFER, op. cit., pp. 71-73, 36-38. 
2 2 Hayden WHITE, Metahistory, p. 1. 
2 3 Allan MEGILL, op. cit., pp. 151-53, 165. 
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historians have drawn on the intellectual resources available in their 
culture. What has been argued, however, especially in the historicist 
tradition, is that the historicity of the human world requires that the 
past be approached with methodological concepts and principles that 
are adapted to "historical" phenomena. Moreover, it has also been ar-
gued, notably by Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber, among others, 
that historians necessarily draw on the social sciences in their study 
of the past. Central to any "critique of historical reason" is a full 
description of the relationship between history and the social 
sciences. 
Megill, however, takes a hard line that yields a crude picture of 
professional historiography. On the assumption that historians are 
making a transparently false claim to "autonomy," he urges the 
"partial dedisciplinization" of history and "multidisciplinary inter-
action of a transformative sort." The second of the "prescriptive 
postulates" that he commends to historians reads: "The Hybri-
dization Postulate: Always establish residences outside the 
discipline"™. Thus, Megill advocates a totalizing interdisciplinarity 
that eliminates the specifically "historical" aspect of the paradigms of 
professional historiography. By a somewhat convoluted route, Berk-
hofer arrives at a similarly anti-historical position. On the 
(questionable) assumption that contextualism is "the primary mode of 
historical understanding," he points out (correctly) that historians 
share this notion with other disciplines. From these premises, he 
draws the odd conclusion that historians "cannot even claim that they 
alone seek to place things in the context of their times, although this 
claim is the supposed differentia of the discipline" 2 5. While historians 
make no such a monopolistic claim, they will argue that the relation 
between time and historical inquiry is a problem that needs to be 
explored. 
While recognizing considerable variation in formulation, it can 
fairly be said that there is general agreement on two distinctive as-
pects of the "historical" approach to the study of the past, both of 
them connected with the dimension of time in the human world: a 
24 Ibidem, p. 169. Emphasis in the original. 
2 5 Robert BERKHOFER, op. cit., pp. 31-34. 
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sensitivity to time-bound, zeitspezifisch phenomena and an interest in 
processes of continuity and change over time. The historicist tradition 
refers to the interconnected principles of individuality and develop-
ment. So defined, history stands in a relationship of tension and com-
plementarity with the generic and synchronic orientation of the social 
sciences. 
In various ways, postmodernism dismisses the distinctively 
historical concern with particularities of time and place. Megill does 
so by assigning a primary role to the generalizing disciplines in the 
study of the past. That is, his proposal for the "partial 
dedisciplinization" of history presumes the lack of any special 
competence in the analysis of the time-bound specificity created by 
processes of continuity and change over time. Dominick LaCapra also 
makes short shrift of the claim that historians have a special interest 
in this area: "The purely documentary view of history often coincides 
with a historicist definition of the historical that identifies the object 
of study as changing 'particulars' in contrast with extratemporal or 
synchronic types or universals." LaCapra disposes of this "venerable 
view" simply by remarking that it "ignores the historical process of 
repetition with variation or change," and then moves on to different 
topics in the rest of the paragraph 2 6. In the postmodern mode, a 
sweeping judgment is presented as an aside, whose validity is self-
evident. Berkhofer takes a formalist approach, treating "uniqueness" 
as the "wishful postulation" of a flawed methodology: 
"Contextualism presumes and therefore produces uniqueness as its 
chief explanatory or interpretive mode.. ." 2 7 
The postmodern dismissal of the developmental dimension of his-
torical thought is expressed succinctly in Frank Ankersmit's comment 
that phenomena of the past ought to be studied "independently of 
their origins" 2 8. On this theme a line from Jean-Francois Lyotard has 
become a mantra for a good deal of postmodern discourse about his-
* Dominick LACAPRA, "Rethinking...", p. 79. 
2 7 Robert BERKHOFER, op. cit, p. 35. 
2 8 Frank ANKERSMIT, "Historiography and Postmodernism" in History 
and Tropology, p. 177. 
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tory: "I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives" . It 
is reflected in the titles of Megill's essay and Berkhofer's book. Such 
grand narratives or great stories, the foundation of professional histo-
riography, we are told, have been discredited. With varying degrees 
of explicitness, it is suggested that developmental analysis of any sort 
is tainted by its association with metanarratives now seen to be 
flawed. 
Megill makes extensive use of the concept of "grand narrative," a 
term that he has borrowed from Lyotard "with reservations and modi-
fications." He takes a dim view of "the grand narratives that have 
prevailed in Western historiography" and which claim to offer "the 
authoritative account of history generally." In elaborating on this 
interpretation, Megill attributes to historians the "ontological assump-
tion... of ultimate world unity." Professional historians, he suggests, 
"have generally held that every particular work of history ought to 
orient itself to history generally —that is, to a single history, which I 
shall here designate as History." He maintains that a belief in a single 
History remains fundamental to professional historiography. Megill 
also argues that the widespread belief in a "single History," embodies 
some of the characteristics of Rankean "universal history," whose 
limitations he explores. Megill concludes, in one of four "prescriptive 
postulates," that historians should renounce the "aspiration towards 
'total history'" 3 0. 
The first thing to be said about the "universal history" thesis is that 
contemporary historians do not in fact subscribe to the assumption of 
"ultimate world unity" in any of its variations. Historians have drifted 
away from that position during the last half of this century. In that 
connection it should be noted that in illustration of a secular version 
of Ranke's universal history Megill quotes J. B. Bury's splendid 1902 
lecture, "The Science of History." Like other postmodernists, Megill 
tends to cite historians remote from the present. He also makes the 
postmodernist point that the current belief in universal history "has an 
important epistemological consequence," in that it "allows historians 
2 9 Jean-Francois LYOTARD, The Postmodern Condition, Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989, p. xxiv. 
3 0 Allan MEGILL, op. cit., pp. 151-153, 157-60, 168, 264 n.3. 
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to maintain that the historical account is an objective representation, 
connected to the standpoint of History itself' 3 1. As every 
undergraduate student of history knows, Bury's lecture is an eloquent 
statement of the late Victorian faith in the objectivity of scientific 
history. The contention that historians today continue to subscribe to 
Bury's views on universal history and objectivity is part of the 
mythology of postmodernism. Finally, it can be said that the 
Lyotardian line functions to discredit the commonsensical develop-
mental views embodied in historical practice. That is, anyone who 
wants to understand the French Revolution or the Holocaust or the 
Victorian family has to examine the historical process that produced 
the phenomenon and the context in which it occurred. That 
proposition does not rest on metaphysical assumptions about the 
totality of History. 
Berkhofer also puts a Lyotardian spin on his account of the defi-
ciencies of professional historiography. In normal history, he writes, 
"the Great Past is the Great Story and nothing but the Great Story." 
His main point is the element of "wishful postulation" that underlies 
the Great Story. Thus, "the paradigm of normal history presumes that 
there existed a 'whole' or 'total' past that can be understood and 
constituted as history, even if only in the mind of a God or his secu-
larized successor, an Omniscient Historian, according to narrative 
logic in some form." In addition, "the Great Story is no less a predi-
cation or presupposition of the normal history paradigm than the 
Great Past" 3 2. Here the anti-developmental thesis is expressed in 
rigidly formalist terms. The historian is obliged to follow a "narrative 
logic" that dictates certain postulations about the past and manner in 
which it must be approached. 
LaCapra's comments on Ernst Cassirer's study of the Enlighten-
ment illustrate the postmodern impatience with even the most basic 
forms of specifically historical conceptualization. Thus, he notes 
traits that have rightly been considered Cassirer's strengths, "his em-
phasis on structure and his ability to find order in seeming chaos," but 
31 Ibidem, p. 159. 
3 2 Robert BERKHOFER, op. cit., pp. 38, 64. For a discussion of the Great 
Story theme see the critical review by Thomas L. HASKELL, in History and 
Theory, 37, 1998, pp. 347-369. 
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questions "the extent to which the order thus found is limited or even 
specious." In the next sentence LaCapra makes it clear that he is not 
merely noting flaws in an interpretation of the Enlightenment, but is 
dismissing a central component of historical analysis: "The point of 
this remark is to suggest that the imposition of 'order and perspicuity' 
—in one of Gibbon's favorite phrases— upon the historical record is 
misleading and that the objective of the historian should rather be to 
explore critically the ways in which the interaction between order and 
its contestatory 'others' takes place"". If LaCapra's remarks are taken 
at face value, they deny the historian a whole battery of concepts, 
such as the Enlightenment, that are essential to handling the 
dimension of time in the human world. The historian simply cannot 
do without the sort of ideal-type construct used by Cassirer. LaCapra 
has put the historian in a heads-I-win-tails-you-lose situation. On the 
one hand, the historian is chided for writing a narrowly factualist 
"documentary history." On the other hand, he is directed not to im-
pose an illusory "order and perspicuity" on the past. 
Allan Megill has provided a glimpse of his own "theory of 
historiography," appended as a concluding afterthought to a useful 
bibliographical article on the work of Jörn Rüsen 3 4. He takes as "the 
point of entry to the revision of Rüsen's disciplinary matrix" the no-
tion of "topic," as expounded in classical rhetoric. While Megill's 
rather dense exposition —in contrast to his usual prose style— does 
not lend itself to brief summary, it illustrates the direction in which 
postmodern attitudes can carry an able historian. In contrast to 
Rüsen's concrete engagement with historical practice and theory, 
Megill 's reliance on a single concept drawn from rhetoric leads to an 
extremely abstract treatment, remote from the world of history and 
historiography. Even the familiar topics of fictionality and objectivity 
Dominick LACAPRA, "Rethinking Intellectual History...", p. 56. Ernst 
CASSIRER, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1951. For a perceptive commentary on LaCapra's views, 
see John H. ZAMMITO, "Are We Being Theoretical Yet? The New 
Historicism, the New Philosophy of History and Practicing Historians" in 
Journal of Modern History, 65,1993, 783-814. 
3 4 Allan MEGILL, "Jörn Rüsen 's Theory of Historiography between 
Modernism and Rhetoric of Inquiry" in History and Theory, 33, 1998, pp. 
39-60. 
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are untouched. Megill has sketched a theory of historiography in 
which concrete historical practice has disappeared in a rhetorical 
morass. In this instance, as in others, postmodernism fosters a dis-
course that obscures the questions that need to be explored. 
4. In sum, there is good reason for historians to have been wary of 
the historical theorizing of postmodernism. They have been asked to 
accept a pervasively anti-historical theory on the grounds that it will 
not only dispel disciplinary myths and misconceptions but also im-
prove their practice. Unlike traditional theory and philosophy of his-
tory, however, it does not attempt to clarify methodological and con-
ceptual problems, but rather seeks to expose self-serving myths that 
supposedly mask the inherent fictionality of historical writing. Post-
modern theorizing proceeds on the tenuous formalist assumption that 
the application of linguistic-rhetorical theory to the literary forms that 
historians necessarily employ will automatically produce an illumi-
nating re-description of historical writing. In actuality, however, the 
end product of postmodern discourse has been a tendentious 
misdescription of professional historiography. 
Because postmodern theory has been applied primarily to his-
torians of the nineteenth century, it has remained curiously out of 
touch with contemporary historiography. Thus, its conception of the 
belief in "objectivity" and factuality imputed to "professional 
historiography" is a construct extrapolated from the ideal of scientific 
history that took shape in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
when the "great narratives" of which we hear so much also 
flourished. In fact, one might easily get the impression that the ideas 
of J. B. Bury —stripped of their eloquence— represent the methodo-
logical and epistemological principles of professional historians 
today. 
Some years ago Jörn Rüsen urged historians to engage in reflec-
tion on "the basic principles of their branch of science" and to for-
mulate for themselves a conception of "the nature and task of histori-
cal studies... by means of which they can venture into dialogue with 
the human sciences on their relationship to one another." The aim of 
such reflection is a statement of "the principles of historical 
knowledge which are normative for history as an academic disci-
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pline" . No one has done more to explore these perennial questions 
than Rusen himself, drawing on the "linguistic turn" as well as Ger-
man historicism and analytical philosophy. As suggested above, 
however, historians who wish to reflect on these matters will not get 
much help from postmodernism, because its anti-historical posture 
entails the dismissal of the very questions that Rusen has posed about 
the distinctive characteristics of the discipline. 
But postmodern theorists have difficulty even acknowledging such 
questions, since substantive issues fall outside the boundaries set by 
formalist presuppositions. Thus, the historicist thesis that the his-
toricityI'GeschichtlichkeitlZeitlichkeit of the human world requires the 
construction of specifically historical concepts lies beyond the reach 
of postmodern theory. The old saw that epistemology presupposes 
ontology cuts no ice with postmodernists. Yet it is precisely in the 
course of their inquiry into concrete phenomena of the past that 
historians have developed analytical concepts and principles adapted 
to their subject matter. Without much theorizing about the dimension 
of time in human life, historians have developed and refined tech-
niques for handling specifically historical aspects of the past. Hence 
critics of postmodernism have remarked that it would have benefited 
from closer contact with historiographical practice and with the theo-
retical discourse based on it. 
Another presupposition that limits the effectiveness of postmodern 
theorizing about history is a simplistic conception of the relation 
between theory and practice. Postmodernists envisage their task as 
the application of an all-powerful theory to historiography while 
preaching the gospel to benighted historians. With his usual conci-
sion, Allan Megill expresses this view of theory in one of the 
prescriptive postulates that he commends to his fellow historians: 
"The Theory Postulate: Always theorize." In the postmodern mode, 
theory is assigned total hegemony. Historians are told that they "can 
awaken universal interest only insofar as their work addresses theo-
retical issues." Thus, an account of the Gunpowder Plot "can have 
interest only insofar as it raises issues of a theoretical sort, detached 
3 5 Jörn RÜSEN, Studies in Metahistory, Pretoria, Human Sciences Re-
search Council, 1993, pp. 161-162. 
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from the specific events of 1605" 3 6. Megill does not fudge his argu-
ment. In a few sentences, he annuls the practice and theory of pro-
fessional historiography. 
Postmodernism obscures the intricate and symbiotic relationship 
that has prevailed between history and theory. On the one hand, 
theory has been enriched by a close examination of historical practice 
and its presuppositions. On the other hand, historiography has bene-
fited from the conceptual and analytical refinement provided by 
theory. Henk de Jong has expressed the hope that "historical theory... 
will turn out to be a valuable help and guide to the practical histo-
rian"37. We might even hope for a synergistic relationship, as in the 
case of Max Weber. The immediate danger, however, as de Jong puts 
it, is that the theory propounded by "postmodern relativists" may be 
"obstructive" to historical practice. 
Postmodernism is obstructive to theory as well as practice, not 
only because of its anti-historical orientation, but also because of its 
neo-Nietzschean view of reason and rationality. In his superb essay 
review, de Jong examines Riisen's critique of "the Nietzschean, 
postmodern view of historical writing." While noting that Rüsen is 
well aware of the merits of postmodernist and aestheticist 
narrativism, he welcomes Riisen's defense of historical rationality 
against the Vernunftfeindschaft of postmodernism. Rüsen takes his 
stand on methodological rationality, that is, on the rules, methods, 
and procedures established by the discipline of history 3 8. Since this 
3 6 Allan MEGILL, "'Grand Narrative'...", p. 172. 
3 7 Henk DE JONG, "Historical Orientation: Jörn Riisen's Answer to 
Nietzsche and his Followers" review of Jörn RÜSEN, Historische Orien-
tierung, Cologne, Bohlau, 1994, in History and Theory, 36, 1997, pp. 270-
288. 
38 Ibidem, pp. 276-285. See "Die Rationalität der Geschichtswissenschaft" 
in Jörn RÜSEN, Historische Orientierung, pp. 69-203. Writing in 1990, 
Rüsen was dismayed by the "post-modernen Irrationalisierung" of the his-
torical consciousness. While noting that theorizing is an essential component 
of historical studies, he suggested that when it is misused -for example to 
determine the particular historical character of facts before they are fully re-
searched- then theorizing becomes a Hure des Verstandes. Ibidem, p. 100; 
idem, Studies, p.43. 
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article has emphasized the postmodern hostility to "historical 
thinking," Riisen's defense of a sophisticated version of what used to 
be called "the historical method" is very much to the point, with the 
obvious proviso that his work provides the best available account of 
the "historical consciousness" in all its complexity 3 9. 
One of the controlling myths of postmodernism is the notion that 
historians are philosophically and theoretically innocent, wedded to a 
primitive empiricist epistemology. Yet if we examine the comments 
of historians in the 1980's and 1990's —chiefly in articles and re-
views— we find a much higher level of theoretical sophistication 
than in any previous generation. Once the distraction of post-
modernism has dissipated, historians will achieve further advances in 
practice and theory. 
See, for example, Rekonstruktion der Vergangenheit. 
